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The JOURNAL takes pleasure in announcing the appointment to
the Editorial Board of the following men: from the Graduate
Class, George Richard Holahan, Jr., M.L., St. Lawrence Uni-
versity, 19o8, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; from the Senior Class. Henry
Ralph Ringe, B.S., University of Pennsylvania, i9o6, of Three
Tuns, Pa., and David Arthur Wilson of Hartford. Conn.
THE LIABILITY OF BOARDS OF HEALTH.
The growing authority constantly being delegated to public
commissions has made the powers and the liabilities of such
bodies extremely important to the community. Boards of health
were among the first commissions created by the legislatures to
subserve the people's interests. and we should therefore expect
to find the law as to the personal liability of their members com-
pletely settled. Unfortunately this is not the case. Certain
courts looking to the welfare of their citizens, base their decisions
upon the principle that statutes protecting health are the highest
law of the land, and that "whenever a public regulation is rea-
sonably demonstrated to be a promoter of health all constitu-
tionally guaranteed gifts must give way to be sacrificed without
compensati6n." 2 Tiedman, State and Fedcral Control of
Property, Sect. 169. In supporting this radical as well as harsh
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theory, such courts have sometimes sacrificed the rights of indi-
viduals with a view to conferring benefits on the body politic.
It is following this principle that the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey, in the case of Valentine v. The City of
Englewood, 71 Atl. 344, recently held: The members of a board
of health, acting in the performance of a public duty under a
public statute to prevent the spread of an infectious or contagious
disease, are not personally liable in a civil action for damages
arising out of their acts in establishing a quarantine even where
the disease does not exist, provided they act in good faith.
The suit arose from the action of the board in quarantining
the plaintiff's house under the belief that his daughter had con-
tracted scarlet fever, when in reality she was suffering from some
minor ailment. In its facts, the c.se was very similar to Beeks v.
Dickinson County, 131 Ia. 244, in which ' court laid down the
same principle where a person, who was erroneously supposed to
have smallpox and therefore quarantined, later sued for the
damages suffered. The New Jersey court did, however; act under
a statute which forbade actions against the board unless want of
reasonable care could be shown, but the attitude taken is shown
by the statement: "The exemption of officers from liability ex-
tends only to matters in which they have jurisdiction under the
statute, and it may be said that the board of health has no juris-
diction unless a cause for disease actually exists. This view is
too narrow . . It is enough if the matter is colorably
though not really in their jurisdiction." Thus, the New Jersey
court viewed the facts from the same stand ' .nt and reached the
same conclusion that the Iowa court did in Becks v. Dickinson
County, supra, where no such statute existed.
As a municipality by recognized authority is not liable for the
acts of a board of health, the ability of board members to escape
suit for damages has the result of denying power to the party
injured by such regulations to obtain ordinary redress. Ogg v.
City of Lansing, 35 Ia. 495. In the case under consideration, the
court suggests appealing to the state for compensation, but those
acquainted with legislative conditions in this country will
recognize how generally futile such an attempt would be. The
decision of this case and of Becks v. Dickinson County, supra, are
of vital interest, as holding that individuals who have suffered
damages through the mistake of health boards are practically to
be denied compensation -for their injuries.
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The New Jersey court argues that to make health boards liable
for acts done in good faith, but because of mistaken belief will
tend to make them over-cautious in their duties and to impair their
efficiency. It is also claimed that as the board is acting for the
state on the principle of agency, the state alone should be held.
Undoubtedly this is sound reasoning, but it is not sufficient to
carry the theory of non-liability of such officers to any length.
Where discretion is given to purely judicial authorities or to
quasi-judicial bodies like highway officers and health boards, it is
acknowledged that the law must to a certain extent protect them
if their work is to be properly done. Daniels v. Hathaway, 65
Vt. 247. So a health officer authorized to take action for the
prevention of the spread of disease, is not liable for injuries re-
sulting from such reasonable and customary measures as he may
in good faith adopt or direct for that purpose with regard to
persons or matters in his jurisdiction. Whidden v. Cheever, 69
N. H. 142. Thus, a board of health was held not liable for the
removal of the wall paper in a room in which a smallpox patient
had been confined, though it was admitted to be questionable
whether the board's action aided in protecting the health of the
city. Seavcy v. Preble, 64 Me. 12o. How far this immunity to
quasi-judicial officers is carried, is shown by the fact that some
courts hold them not liable even when actuated by malice and this
is declared by Mr. Mechem to be the better rule. Mechen Public
,Officers, Sect. 640.
This freedom from liability is however limited by the juris-
diction and beyond this the exemption of quasi-judicial officers
from liability does not extend. When acting beyond their juris-
diction, the officer is as much out of the protection of the law in
respect to that act, as if he held no office at all. Cooley on Torts,
P. 379. It makes no difference whether the quasi-judicial officer
knew he was acting ultra vires or not. As was said by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in a case holding that the discretion
of highway officers was limited by the rights of individuals, and
that when they invaded those rights the officers became personally
liable. This rule, sometimes, when the agent has acted in good
faith and without knowledge of legal authority may seem to
operate oppressively, but it is a necessity and a very just rule not-
withstanding, and the full protection of the citizen in his legal
rights would be impossible without it. Absence of bad faith can
never excuse a trespass, though the existence of bad faith may
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sometimes aggravate it. Cubit v. O'Dett, 51 Mich. 351. The same
rule has been applied to health boards. Where in a clear case of
unwarranted authority, the members of a health commission
roped off part of the plaintiff's land in order to bring it within
the hospital grounds, they were held liable. Barry v. Smith, i99
Mass. 78.
It is difficult to understand why the two arguments advanced in
Valentine v. The City of Englewood, apply to a further extension
of this well recognized doctrine. The members of the board are
not agents of the state when they do acts which are not authorized
by the legislature, and it seems unlikely that they will pursue a
different course from other public officers and fail to do their
duty because they will be held liable for exceeding their powers.
Nevertheless, the New Jersey court does extend the usual limits
of the rule upon the theory that the health officers were colorably
in their jurisdiction and were therefore protected. To support
this holding a New Jersey case giving similar protection to a
justice of the peace is cited. Grove v. Van Dyne, 44-N. J. Law
654. This immunity to justices of the peace has been given in a
few states, the Maine courts basing their decision upon the
ground that "such erroneous decision is a judicial one for which a
justice is not liable." Rush v. Buckley, IoO Me. 322. That this
is not a thoroughly settled principle is shown by the dissenting
opinion to the case of Justice, now Chief Justice Emery, which
characterized the doctrine as "impairing the right of personal
liberty and subversive of long established rules of the state." If
it is threatening to thus extend the powers of justices, how much
more dangerous is it to so increase the authority of public bodies
like boards of health? II good faith is to be the test of the
jurisdiction of commissions constituted by the legislature, then at
once private property and personal rights are subject to distruc-
tion through the ignorance of boards.
Fortunately, however, as contrasted with this radical view, a
number of state courts hold that unjustified interference by health
boards will render the members personally liable. This principle
was recently expressed by the New York Supreme Court in a
case where the selling of milk was interfered with. "The right
to carry on the business of sellig :inilk is a constitutional one.
This right can only be interfered with in the exercise of the police
power of the state because, in the manner of his conduct of the
business or the circumstances surrounding it, the public health is
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imperiled. If, as a matter of fact, the public health is not im-
periled, the summary determination of the board of health does
not make it so; and its interference with his business would sub-
ject the persons constituting the board to the same perils and
liabilities as an individual who interfered with a lawful business."
People v. Dept. of Health. 51 Miscl. N. Y. 19o. The court is
simply following out the doctrine well established in New York.
that whoever abates an alleged nuisance and thus destroys and
injures private property or interferes with private rights, whether
he is a public health officer or a private person, unless he acts
under the judgment or order of the court having jurisdiction,
does so at his peril; and when his act is challenged in regular
judicial tribunals, to protect him it must appear that the thing
abated was in fact a nuisance. People v. Board of Health, 140
N. Y. i. The same view has been held in Miller v. Horton. 152
Mass. 540: Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48. and in Lowe v. Conroy,
120 Wis. 151. The rights of a man whose property has been
destroyed and one whose property is injured and whose personal
rights have been invaded are hardly to be distinguished. Indeed,
the New Jersey court cites as resting on the same grounds, Ray-
mond v. Valentine, 51 Conn. 81, where property actually was des-
troyed by an over-zealous board of health and where no recovery
was allowed.
Very little seems to be gained by the theory of non-liability of
health boards,.even where the fourteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution requiring due process of law is not infringed upon.
Nothing is gained in time because health boards may always act
immediately on property and later hold a hearing to determine
whether their action was justified. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,
211 U. S. 306. The increase in the efficiency of the board is at
least questionable, and if the legislature fears that the board mem-
bers will be less active if responsible for their own mistakes, the
city can be made liable or some other form of redress given. On
the other hand, if no right against the board is allowed and none
against the municipality is authorized, the consequences are most
serious. The personal and property rights of a private citizen
may be heedlessly invaded and be left without adequate remedy.
This condition of things is of course linited by the fourteenth
amendment, but great harn may be done within the wide police
powers accredited to the state over matters of health. Even more
serious is the danger of giving such powers to other boards. If
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the health board members are to escape liability, are the members
of the city transit commissions to be held liable? Public service
commissions, railroad commissions and numerous other boards
with great and small powers, are to-day rapidly being created in
accordance with our modern theories of government. To be
permanently successful these boards must conform in their
powers and liabilities to the acknowledged and equitable principles
of the law. No legal principle is more firmly established than
that where there is a right there is a remedy. To permit property
to be taken or personal privileges to be infringed upon where
there is no justification except the well-meant ignorance of public
officers, is in denial of such a right.
STARE DECISIS IN CRIMINAL LAW.
In a recent decision by the Supreme Court bf North Carolina
in the case of State v. Fulton, 63 S. E. 145, it was held that a
husband was indictable for slandering his wife unaer section
3640 (19o5 Revisal) of the code which provided that: "If any
person shall attempt, in a wanton and malicious manner, to des-
troy the reputation of an innocent woman by words written or
spoken, which amount to a charge of incontinency, every person
so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This decision
directly overruled the case of State v. Edens, 95 N. C. 693. The
judge who gave the deciding vote relied upon the doctrine as
laid down by the same court in State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, where
it had been decided that a tenant was indictable for the removal
of crops without giving the landlord five days' notice, and that
he, the tenant, could not show in defense that he had sustained
damage to the amount of the rent due by the failure of the
landlord to comply with the contract. At the same time particular
attention was called to stare decisis in relation to criminal law. rn
the case of State v. Bell, supra, the court had overruled a former
decision of the same court, interpreting the penal statute, as laid
down in State v. Neal, 129 N. C. 692, and applied the rule so that
a new trial was ordered, but it was to be conducted under the
law as declared in the overruled decision. Connor, J., said: "In
view of the peculiar conditions with which we are dealing, we
have deemed it but just to the defendants, and not at variance
with any authority in this court, to order a new trial, with the
direction that the testimony offered in this case, insofar as it is
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made admissible by the ruling of this court in State v. Neal, be
admitted. If the defendants shall be able to establish their de-
fense in accordance with the ruling in Neal's case, they are en-
titled to do so, but the construction now put upon the statute
will be applied to all future cases. While, as we have said, we
find no authority directly in point, we think this course is sus-
tained by what is said in Wells on Stare Decisis, 566."
In the statement of what is stare decisis. text writers and courts
are well agreed. It is simply a doctrine of following established
precedents and adhering to instituted principles. Although the
doctrine is well-settled as applicable in affecting vested contractual
rights, yet there is a paucity of decisions upon the subject in con-
nection with the criminal law. The subject was slightly touched
upon by the notorious Jeffries in Roswell's Case, IO How. St. Tr.
147, 267. In the case of Lanier v. State, 57 Miss. lO7, in an
action of assault, the court said: "The doctrine of stare decisis
in criminal cases cannot be carried to the extent of allowing to
violators of law a vested interest in rules which have been erron-
eously sanctioned." The court then overruled Smith v. State, 39
Miss. 521, also a case of assault, and laid down the true doctrine.
But, what the court now (in Lanier v. State) calls the true doc-
trine, was inconsistent, not with the decision in Smith v. State.
but merely with a dictum therein, in the laying down of which
the previous court had gone farther than the facts had war-
ranted. For it is a well-established principle that, "the doctrine
of stare decisis is not applicable to dicta found in opinions of
the court." Friedman v. Suttle, 85 Pac. 726. Furthermore, it
has been held: "The Supreme Court will not follow the line
marked out by a single precedent, placing its decision on the rule
of stare decisis alone, without regard to the ground on which such
case was adjudged." State v. Williams, 13 S. C. 546. The mere
fact that there has been at sometime in the past a decision upon
similar facts should not be sufficient to invoke stare decisis in
criminal law more so than it would where there was a vested right
involved. In order that "the rule of stare decisis can be force-
fully invoked, there must be three elements which enter into the
authority of the case, First, the unanimity with which its judg-
ment was pronounced; second, the fact that it has been followed.
and third, the duration of time during which it has been. openly
followed or tacitly assented to." State v. Williams, (supra)
554. It was only recently held: The decision that the giving of
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a charge that the jury in considering the testimony of the accused,
may consider his position and interest, will in the future be
ground for a reversal, rendered after the court had several times
criticised such a charge as violating the Constitution, declaring
that judges shall not charge with respect to matter of fact,
should not be applied to a case tried before the decision, and the
giving of such a charge before that time is not ground for re-
versal. People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. 364.
It is remarkable that stare decisis has not played more of a
definite part in our criminal law. It has been a factor in a certain
vague sense, but forceful utterances from the bench upon the
point are few and far between. It is but reasonable that wrong
decisions in criminal law should be overruled, but there should
be exceptions even to this rule. When we find a wrong merely
nialuin prohibitiui, forbidden by a statute, it is but just that one
should be allowed to act under that statute within the restraints
which the high court of that particular political authority has
laid down. To convict and punish a man under such circum-
stances would be anything but justice. It was with this spirit
that Frazer J., said: "We ought, in any case, to proceed with
great caution in reversing opinions heretofore pronounced by this
court, and received and acted upon as settling the law, and
especially when a rule of property would be overturned, and
that would be made criminal, which had before been adjudged
lawful." Grutbbs r. State, 24 Ind. 295. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the case of State v. Williams, above referred to, over-
ruling State v. Harper, 6 S. C. 464, was clearly justifiable on the
ground that the act committed was inaltin in se. The fact that
State v. Harper had been decided only four years before, and
that it alone was relied upon to support the doctrine of stare
decisis, also tends to explain a proposition only paradoxically
adverse to the stare decisis doctrine. If a man commits an act
malum in se, then of course, unless the circumstances are very
peculiar, there can be no valid objection to an overthrow of the
doctrine as had been previously laid down, especially so when it
is upheld by only one decision. For when an act is inalunt in se,
the perpetrator rihust have been conscious of the fact that he was
committing a crime. When a decision, oi a line of decisions are
adverse to a defendant and the present court is well satisfied that
the principles of those decisions are wrong, and the fact is ac-
centuated by being invoked by the defendant, even in his own
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favor, the court should change the existing doctrine. Here there
would be no vested rights overturned nor is anyone to suffer.
The state does not care to punish under a line of erroneous
decisions. It does not seek for revenge; and to suffer the accused
to be pronounced guilty under decisions which should never have
been the law, is against the spirit of Anglo-Saxon criminal law,
where all doubtful advantages are given to a defendant. And
while the reversal of a judicial decision is not ex posto facto law,
as is intended in the constitutional prohibition. Weber v. Rogers,
I88 U. S. io, yet in spirit, such a reversal has so much the
nature of a retroactive effect that it is unfair to have it operate
in.the ordinary case of crime merely malum prohibitum.
In conclusion, and it is advanced with respect, that the doc-
trine as laid down in State v. Fulton, ratifying State v. Bell, ante.
was in the highest sense of the word a just and intelligent pronun-
ciation of that type of fairness which should pervade the law; for
while a rule which had operated was declared no law, yet the
accused was allowed to defend under the abrogated rule-a rule
under which this defendant might have acted upon advice of
counsel-based on the law as set forth in the first 6pinion. For,
as Lord Hardwicke says: "Certainty is the mother of repose,
and therefore the law aims at certainty." i Dick, 245. It is,
therefore, respectfully submitted that where the accused has acted
under a decision as laid down by the highest courts of that poli-
tical sovereignty, and the accused is guilty of a crime merely
nzaluin prohibituin, and not of a crime inalum in se, that the
court in declaring that rule which had previously stood for law
as no law, should allow a new trial tinder the abrogated rule. and
thus in spirit carry out that basic principle, not only of Anglo-
Saxon law, but of all law worthy of the name: Stare decisis, et
non, quieta inovere.
RIGHT OF A LABOR UNION TO ENFORCE A STRIKE ORDER BY THE
IMPOSITION OF A FINE.
The purpose of a labor union is to protect its members and to
improve their condition by securing shorter hours of labor and
a higher rate of wages. Great good has been accomplished along
these lines and the working conditions of all classes of labor have
been thus materially improved. That strikes may be called to
accomplish this purpose is well established, and the usual method
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of enforcing members to obey a strike order is by fining for
disobedience. The right to impose such a fine is brought into
question in the case of L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayer's
Benevolent and Protective Union, No. 3, et al., 85 N. E. 897.
(Mass.)
The complainant is a corporation employing a large number of
workmen. The defendants are two unincorporated associations
and certain individuals as officers and members thereof. The
question involved is whether or not an injunction will lie to
prevent such'an association from enforcing a strike against the
complainant by fining such of its members as continue in its em-
ploy after the strike has been declared. A decision granting an
injunction was rendered by a divided court of three to two.
Justice Sheldon filed a strong dissenting opinion, and when we
consider the following quotations from the opinion of Justice
Loring, it becomes evident that the decision was based upon the
doctrine of stare decisis rather than upon the merits of the case
itself: "For reasons stated in the opinion of Justice 'Sheldon, I
should agree with the conclusion there reached were it not for the
recent decision made by this court in Martell v. White, 185 Mass.
255," and later on he continues: "In my opinion, the decision in
Martell v. White ought not to be overruled in the case at bar
although it was wrong, provided laborers and labor unions will
not stiffer injustice from our standing by it. The evils which
ensue from overruling a wrong decision where no injustice is
involved in following it, are greater than those which come from
standing by it." It is difficult to conceive of a wrong decision
which does not involve an injustice to the person against whom
such a decision is rendered.
The purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis is to produe cer-
tainty and stability in our jurisprudence, and should be con-
clusive when former decisions have recognized and established
rules of interpretation with reference to which parties have
entered into contractual or other legal relations. Menge v. The
Madrid, 4o Fed. 677; Treon v. Brown, 14 Ohio 482. But in the
present case it is not contended that the parties to the controversy
had entered into any legal relations whatever, relying upon the
doctrine of Martell v. White, supra, and that the rule of stare
decisis should not be applied indiscriminately is well settled.
"Infallibility is to be conceded to no tribunal. A legal principle-
to be well settled must be founded on sound reason." Leavitt v.
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Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71. "When a court comes to the deliberate
conclusion that it has made a mistake, it is better that it frankly
acknowledge its mistake and declare the true doctrine, as it should
have done." Hines v. Driver, 89 Ind. 339.
The validity of by-laws authorizing the imposition of fines, to
enforce members of a voluntary association to obey its rules, is so
universally admitted that it is discussed in but few cases. Bren-
nan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. Law 729. In fact, the only cases
in which their validity seems to be questioned are Boutwell v.
Marr, 71 Vt. i, and Martell v. White, supra; and in the latter
case the decision was expressly based on the assumption that the
fine imposed was "so large as to amount to moral intimidation or
coercion," while the rule laid down in the present case is so broad
as to include all fines regardless of amount. "All that is up for
decision in the case at bar is that the imposition of a fine is the
use of unlawful means."
The present case may be readily distinguished from Quinn v.
Leathen, i9oi A. C. 495; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 205. and
others cited by the court, in that no contractual rights of the
complainant are involved. It hired its men by the day and it
might have discharged them or they might have left at the close
of any day.
The court in the ruling opinion discussed the option which a
member has to either leave the organization or abide by its rules,
and makes the following comparison: "The highwayman, who
presents his cocked pistol to the traveler and demands his purse
under pain of instant death in case of refusal, offers his victim
a choice. He may either give tip his purse and live, or refuse and
die. . . . And so the member of a labor union has the choice
either to pay the fine or leave the union." It is difficult to see the
analogy between the two cases: the organization has the un-
doubted right to expel a member. Has the highwayman the right
to take the life of his victim?
The use of the injuntion in labor disputes has been so extended
in recent years that it threatens to seriously impair the efficiency
of labor unions in the excellent work they are doing for the
uplifting of the working classes.
